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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER, Chief Judge. 
 
Franklin Wilson was arrested and spent a month in jail 
for an armed robbery he did not commit. As plaintiff in this 
civil rights lawsuit arising under 42 U.S.C. S 1983, he 
claims that his arrest and subsequent incarceration 
violated his federal and state constitutional rights to be free 
from arrest and detention without probable cause. The crux 
of his claim is that the arresting officer, defendant Darrin J. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
* Honorable Louis H. Pollak, United States District Court Judge for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. 
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Russo, both lied and omitted material facts during his 
application for Wilson's arrest warrant. Russo told the 
judge that two victims, who each had ample opportunity to 
view the robber, had stated that the assailant was between 
6'3" and 6'5". Russo did not, however, tell him that 
Wilson's driving abstract showed him to be 5'11". Nor did 
Russo tell the judge that one of these eyewitnesses did not 
identify Wilson when shown a photographic array. What he 
did tell him was that the other victim positively identified 
Wilson, and that someone else had seen Wilson in the 
vicinity near the time of the robbery. Wilson urges us to 
decide that Russo omitted the exculpatory facts with 
"reckless disregard for the truth" and that the warrant 
affidavit would not have established probable cause if the 
officer had been more forthcoming. 
 
The District Court found that Russo had qualified 
immunity and granted summary judgment in his favor. In 
evaluating a claim that an officer both asserted and omitted 
facts with reckless disregard for the truth, we hold that: (1) 
omissions are made with reckless disregard for the truth 
when an officer recklessly omits facts that any reasonable 
person would know that a judge would want to know; and 
(2) assertions are made with reckless disregard for the truth 
when an officer has obvious reasons to doubt the truth of 
what he or she is asserting. Viewing the facts in the light 
most favorable to the plaintiff, we conclude that Russo 
acted in reckless disregard for the truth in some, but not 
all, of his omissions and assertions to the judge. However, 
since none of these misstatements or omissions were 
material, in that the warrant would have established 
probable cause even if Russo had not made them, we 
conclude that Wilson's right to be free from arrest without 
probable cause was not violated. Therefore, we affirm the 
grant of summary judgment.1 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Wilson also appeals the District Court's grant of summary judgment to 
the officer who initiated the investigation, Clement Woroniecki, who, he 
alleges, violated his rights by inadequate and sloppy investigation. 
However, there is insufficient evidence in the record that Woroniecki's 
actions effected a deprivation of Wilson's rights, let alone an 
unconstitutional deprivation. As we discuss further infra at note 5, 
negligent police work, even if proven, does not violate the due process 
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I. Facts and Procedural History 
 
A. The Robbery and Preliminary Investigation 
 
On February 3, 1995, Officers Lipp and Woroniecki of the 
Franklin Township (New Jersey) Police Department 
responded to a call reporting an armed robbery at the Great 
Expressions Floral Shop in the Franklin Towne Center. 
Detective Woroniecki interviewed Renee Braverman, the 
owner of the shop, and Graham Druce, an employee in the 
shop. They both said that the robber was in the store from 
a little before 3:00 pm until approximately 3:50 pm. When 
the robber entered the shop, Braverman was discussing a 
bridal order with a customer. Several times during the 
robber's visit, Druce approached him and asked him if he 
needed assistance, which he repeatedly declined. The bridal 
order customer left around 3:50, and the robber brought a 
glass vase and candle to the counter, behind which 
Braverman was standing. The robber asked Druce, who 
was standing in the back room, if the candle would cause 
the glass vase to break. When Druce walked towards the 
counter the robber put his left hand on Druce's right 
shoulder and told Braverman to empty the register quickly 
and put the money in a brown paper bag along with the 
candle and vase. Druce and Braverman both said they saw 
a small revolver in his right hand. 
 
Braverman, a white woman who is "around five six," 
described the robber as a light skinned black male, 
approximately 30 years old, "very tall," between 6'2" and 
6'4", between 190 and 200 pounds, with black wavy hair, 
a waist-length light denim jacket, cream colored sweater, 
and blue denim jeans. Druce, a "five-five,five-six" white 
man, described the robber as a "very tall male, light black 
in color, his middle 20s, about 25, about 6'5" tall, maybe a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
clause. We will therefore affirm the District Court's grant of summary 
judgment for Woroniecki without further discussion. 
 
Wilson originally sued the Franklin Township Police Department and 
the Township of Franklin, but he did not appeal the District Court's 
grant of summary judgment as to those parties. 
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little bit taller." He told the police the robber had an athletic 
build, was clean shaven, had well groomed short hair and 
was wearing a blue denim jacket, blue denim jeans, and 
sneakers. Druce said that if he saw a picture of the robber 
he was absolutely certain he could pick him out because of 
his noticeable height. 
 
Detective Bisignio, also of the Franklin Township Police, 
canvassed the area for witnesses. Kelly N. DaVila, who 
worked in a nearby dental office, told him that she had 
seen a dental patient named Franklin Wilson in the 
Franklin Center, walking away from the Mayfair Foodtown 
Area towards a pizza shop after 3:00 that day, "probably 
about a half hour" before the police officers arrived (making 
her estimated viewing around 3:30). She described Wilson 
as a 6'0" tall, clean shaven, thin, light-skinned black man 
with brown hair and brown eyes. She told Bisignio that he 
had some entanglement with heroin because his dental 
records indicated that he was seeking methadone 
treatment. 
 
Bisignio relayed this information to Woroniecki, who 
conducted a criminal history and Department of Motor 
Vehicles (DMV) check of Wilson. The criminal history report 
listed Wilson as being 5'10" and weighing 160 pounds. The 
DMV record apparently listed him as being 5'11". 
Woroniecki received a photograph of Wilson from the 
Middlesex County Identification Bureau, which he took to 
the Somerset County Sheriff 's Office in order to compile a 
photographic lineup. The office compiling the photographic 
array was apparently not aware of the physical descriptions 
of the witnesses. On the afternoon of February 6, 
Woroniecki fell ill and ceased all involvement in the 
investigation of the floral shop robbery. 
 
Detective Russo took over the investigation. On February 
6, he was provided with Officer Lipp's report and the 
photographic array from the Somerset County Sheriff 's 
Office. Lipp's report includes a summary of the robbery and 
a description of the robber that combined the Druce and 
Braverman physical descriptions. The report identifies the 
robber as between 6'3" and 6'5". It does not mention 
DaVila's assertion that she saw Wilson. Russo claimed that 
he did not review any other officer's notes. He testified that 
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he reviewed and authorized the photographic array without 
knowing what the witnesses had said about the robber. 
 
Russo showed the photographic array to Braverman and 
Druce individually. He told them each that the robber 
might not be in the array, and that if they were to identify 
anyone they must be one hundred percent certain that the 
person they were identifying was the person who robbed 
them. Braverman immediately selected Wilson's photograph 
as representing the robber. Druce studied the array for 
about two minutes, indicating no recognition, andfinally 
concluded that he could not say with certainty that he 
recognized the robber among them. 
 
Russo testified that he does not remember whether he 
knew Wilson's height and weight when he applied for the 
warrant. When questioned during deposition about whether 
he knew Wilson's actual height and weight, he said"Well, 
it'd probably be on the driver's license abstract because I 
obtained that actually just for his address." In his response 
to Russo's summary judgment motion, Wilson made the 
uncontroverted assertion that this information is on the 
driver's abstract. 
 
B. The Arrest Warrant Application, Arrest, and 
         Initiation of Suit 
 
Russo met with a prosecutor and reviewed the facts 
before the two of them sought a search warrant from 
Superior Court Judge Dilts. Through his responses to the 
questions of the prosecutor, Russo informed Judge Dilts 
that two witnesses had described the robber as a light 
skinned black male "six-three to six-five." He did not tell 
him that Wilson's driver's abstract stated that he was 5'11", 
or that his criminal history report stated that he was 5'10". 
Russo also represented that he had created a photographic 
array "as a result of the physical descriptions." This is 
contrary to what the record indicates, which is that those 
making the photo array had the photograph of Wilson, but 
were never told of the victims' descriptions of the robber. He 
told the judge that the owner of the florist shop 
unequivocally picked Wilson out of a photo lineup. He did 
not tell him that the other witness had failed to identify 
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Wilson as the robber when shown the same photo array. 
Russo stated that an employee of a nearby dentist's office 
who recognized Wilson had seen him around three o'clock. 
He did not inform the judge that she had stated that she 
saw Wilson around 3:30, by which time the robber was 
already in the shop. 
 
We also note that Russo answered the prosecutor's 
questions as if he had been there himself, suggesting that 
he had been the primary investigator and interviewer at the 
scene of the crime. He did not tell the judge that, in the 
photo array, Wilson looked ethnically different from the 
others.2 Russo also did not inform the judge that height 
and weight were not indicated on the photo lineup. 
 
On the basis of Russo's testimony, Judge Dilts issued a 
warrant of arrest and to search for evidence. Russo 
executed the warrant the evening of February 6. Wilson was 
incarcerated for a month, after which the Somerset Grand 
Jury refused to indict him. Thereafter, he brought this suit 
against Russo, Woroniecki, and the Franklin Township 
Police Department under 42 U.S.C. S 1983, alleging that his 
Fourth, Fourteenth, and Fifth Amendment rights were 
violated, as well as his rights under the New Jersey 
Constitution, and the New Jersey common law. The 
defendants moved for summary judgment, and the District 
Court granted the motion.3 Wilson appealed. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. We note this omission not because we think there was a marked 
difference in appearance, but because Wilson's briefs focus on it. As we 
discuss infra, our independent review of the photographic array satisfies 
us that although Wilson has slightly different features than the other 
five 
faces pictured, no reasonable jury could find that the difference was 
significant or prejudicial. 
 
3. The District Court did not address the officers' motion for summary 
judgment on the state law claims in its decision. Therefore, although we 
will affirm the grant of summary judgment on the federal claims, we will 
remand to the District Court so that it may evaluate the state claims and 
determine whether or not to retain jurisdiction of them under 28 U.S.C. 
S 1367(c). 
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II. The Right to Be Free of Unlawful Arrest  
 
To recover under 42 U.S.C. S 1983, Wilson must 
establish that a state actor engaged in conduct that 
deprived him of "rights, privileges, or immunities" secured 
by the constitution or laws of the United States. See Kneipp 
v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1204 (3d Cir. 1996). Because 
Russo has fairly raised a qualified immunity defense, 
Wilson has a further burden. According to the doctrine of 
qualified immunity, law enforcement officers acting within 
their professional capacity are generally immune from trial 
"insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established 
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable 
person would have known." Wilson v. Layne, 119 S.Ct. 
1692, 1699 (1999) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald , 457 U.S. 
800, 818 (1982)). 
 
The qualified immunity defense requires that we engage 
in a two-step analysis. First, we must "determine whether 
the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of an actual 
constitutional right at all." Conn v. Gabbert , 119 S. Ct. 
1292, 1295 (1999). Only if he has should we "proceed to 
determine whether that right was clearly established at the 
time of the alleged violation." Id. Summary judgment is 
appropriate if no reasonable juror could conclude that 
Wilson's clearly established rights were violated. See Orsatti 
v. New Jersey State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 482 (3d Cir. 1995). 
 
This does not mean that the jury determines the 
contours of the right. Rather, after making a legal 
determination about the existence of a right, and whether 
it is clearly established, we determine whether the facts on 
the record are such that a jury could conclude that the 
clearly established right was violated. See id.  As a 
methodological matter, we commonly work backwards: We 
arrange the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, 
and then determine whether, given precedent, those"facts," 
if true, would constitute a deprivation of a right. And then, 
if necessary, we determine if the right is clearly established. 
In this case, since we conclude that Wilson has not 
adduced facts from which a jury could conclude that his 
constitutional rights were deprived at all, we need not 
engage in the second inquiry. 
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Wilson contends that he was arrested without probable 
cause in violation of his Fourth Amendment right to be free 
from unreasonable seizure. He acknowledges that he was 
arrested pursuant to a warrant, but claims that the 
warrant was not supported by probable cause. However, 
the statements given to Judge Dilts by Officer Russo clearly 
establish probable cause: He was told that a robbery had 
taken place; that the descriptions of the victims were used 
to compile a photo array; that one of the victims had 
quickly and positively identified the suspect from the photo 
array; and that an employee in a nearby establishment had 
seen Wilson in the vicinity near the time he supposedly 
entered the flower shop. See infra Section I.B. 
 
In light of these facts, the only way that Wilson can 
succeed is if he proffers evidence that Russo recklessly 
disregarded the truth in his warrant application, and that 
a warrant application based on what Russo should have 
told the judge would have lacked probable cause. As this 
recitation suggests, an arrest warrant issued by a 
magistrate or judge does not, in itself, shelter an officer 
from liability for false arrest. See Sherwood v. Mulvihill, 113 
F.3d 396, 399 (3d Cir. 1997). Rather, a plaintiff may 
succeed in a S 1983 action for false arrest made pursuant 
to a warrant if the plaintiff shows, by a preponderance of 
the evidence: (1) that the police officer "knowingly and 
deliberately, or with a reckless disregard for the truth, 
made false statements or omissions that create a falsehood 
in applying for a warrant;" and (2) that "such statements or 
omissions are material, or necessary, to the finding of 
probable cause." Id.4 
 
A. Reckless Disregard for the Truth 
 
With these precepts in view, we must first consider 
whether Wilson adduced sufficient evidence that a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Wilson argues that because a jury could conclude that Russo lied, 
Russo loses the protection of qualified immunity regardless of the import 
of the lie. Adopting his argument would not affect the result in this case 
because we ultimately conclude that even if Russo had been perfectly 
straightforward in his warrant application, there would have been 
probable cause to arrest Wilson. 
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reasonable jury could conclude that Russo made 
statements or omissions that he "knew [were] false, or 
would have known [were] false except for his reckless 
disregard for the truth." United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 
897, 923 (1984); cf. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 
(1978). In Franks, the Court held that where a defendant 
showed by the preponderance of the evidence that a false 
statement necessary to the finding of probable cause was 
made "knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless 
disregard for the truth," the constitution requires that any 
evidence derived from the exercise of that warrant had be 
excluded from a criminal trial. Id. at 155. But as the Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has 
lamented, "[u]nfortunately, the Supreme Court in Franks 
gave no guidance concerning what constitutes a reckless 
disregard for the truth in fourth amendment cases, except 
to state that `negligence or innocent mistake[is] 
insufficient.' " United States v. Davis , 617 F.2d 677, 694 
(D.C. Cir. 1979) (quoting Franks, 438 U.S. at 171). This 
case, with its hybrid allegation (Russo purportedly doctored 
some facts and failed to inform the judge of others) requires 
us to acknowledge that reckless disregard for the truth 
means different things when dealing with omissions and 
assertions, and to explain the different methodologies for 
dealing with each. 
 
1. Omissions 
 
All storytelling involves an element of selectivity. We 
cannot demand that police officers relate the entire history 
of events leading up to a warrant application with every 
potentially evocative detail that would interest a novelist or 
gossip (". . . the witness blushed when I mentioned the gun, 
and blinked six times while studying the photographic 
array. I noticed his hand crept up to his lips (which were 
chapped) . . ."). On the other hand, one of the reasons for 
requiring a neutral magistrate to evaluate probable cause is 
that an uninterested party is presumably better suited to 
review and evaluate the facts than an officer pursuing a 
lead. "The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is 
not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law 
enforcement the support of the usual inferences which 
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reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists 
in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral 
and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the 
officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of 
ferreting out crime." Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 
13-14 (1948) (cited in Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 
586 n.24 (1980)). It follows that a police officer cannot 
make unilateral decisions about the materiality of 
information, or, after satisfying him- or herself that 
probable cause exists, merely inform the magistrate or 
judge of inculpatory evidence. 
 
Recognizing the tension between the extreme models that 
could arise if either of these competing concerns were taken 
alone--requiring a police officer to tell all, and permitting a 
police officer to independently determine materiality--we 
follow the common sense approach of the Court of Appeals 
for the Eighth Circuit and hold that omissions are made 
with reckless disregard if an officer withholds a fact in his 
ken that "[a]ny reasonable person would have known that 
this was the kind of thing the judge would wish to know." 
United States v. Jacobs, 986 F.2d 1231, 1235 (8th Cir. 
1993). In Jacobs, the court concluded that the officer acted 
with reckless disregard when he told the magistrate that a 
drug sniffing dog showed "interest" in the bag of the 
defendant but failed to inform the magistrate that it had 
not gone into "alert." Id. at 1234."Because of the highly 
relevant nature of the omitted information," the court held 
that "the omission occurred at least with reckless disregard 
of its effect upon the affidavit." Id. 
 
Russo alleges that Wilson made the following omissions 
in his warrant application: (1) he did not tell the judge that 
although Officer Lipp's investigative report stated that the 
robber was between 6'3" and 6'5", Wilson's driver's abstract 
indicated that he was 5'11"; (2) he did not tell the judge 
that Druce did not pick Wilson out of an array; (3) he did 
not tell the judge that in the photo array, Wilson looked 
ethnically different from the others; and (4) he did not 
mention that height and weight were not indicated on the 
photo array. 
 
Applying the test adopted above, we address these 
contentions in turn. Any reasonable person would know 
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that the significant height differential, and the fact that an 
eyewitness-victim did not identify Wilson, were"the kind of 
thing[s] the judge would wish to know." Jacobs, 986 F.2d at 
1235. On the other hand, we do not believe that an officer 
can be expected to communicate the apparent ethnicity of 
the victim, or slight variations in appearance on the 
photographic line-up absent circumstances making these 
factors more important or prejudicial. Finally, the fact that 
height and weight were not listed on the photo array is so 
routine as to be unremarkable to a judge. Although these 
latter facts could be used for impeachment at trial, a police 
officer cannot be expected to present a judge with complete 
background. 
 
2. Assertions 
 
Unlike omissions, assertions can be made with reckless 
disregard for the truth even if they involve minor details-- 
recklessness is measured not by the relevance of the 
information, but the demonstration of willingness to 
affirmatively distort truth. In applying the reckless 
disregard test to assertions, we have borrowed from the free 
speech arena and equated reckless disregard for the truth 
with a "high degree of awareness of [the statements'] 
probable falsity." Lippay v. Christos, 996 F.2d 1490, 1501 
(3d Cir. 1993) (quoting Garrison v. Louisiana , 379 U.S. 64, 
74 (1964)); see also United States v. Clapp, 46 F.3d 795, 
800 (8th Cir. 1995) (reckless disregard for the truth is 
exhibited when expressing that which was not "believed or 
appropriately accepted" as true). An assertion is made with 
reckless disregard when "viewing all the evidence, the 
affiant must have entertained serious doubts as to the 
truth of his statements or had obvious reasons to doubt the 
accuracy of the information he reported." Clapp, 46 F.3d at 
801 n.6. 
 
Applying these tests to this case, Russo had reasons to 
"doubt the accuracy" of his intimation that he had 
personally investigated the entire case and interviewed the 
witnesses after the robbery. More importantly, a jury could 
conclude that Russo "must have entertained serious doubts 
about the truth of his statement" that the dental worker 
had seen Wilson around 3:00, instead of around 3:30. 
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Because he told the judge about DaVila's identification, 
Russo must have learned of DaVila's statement from 
somewhere; a jury could infer that he learned of it from the 
transcript of DaVila's statement or a complete report, either 
of which would include her statement that she saw Wilson 
about a half an hour before the police arrived, which would 
place her sighting at about 3:30. If Russo knew of the time 
difference, he had "obvious reasons to doubt" his assertion 
to the judge that a witness saw Wilson around 3:00. 
 
As to the other information from the other officers' 
reports, Wilson did not adduce any evidence that Russo 
would have examined these reports as a matter of course or 
policy, or any evidence from which a jury could infer 
knowledge of their content. Moreover, there is no evidence 
that Russo knew that the array was developed from 
Wilson's photo alone. Therefore, a jury could not conclude 
that his representation that the array was made"as a 
result of the physical descriptions" was made with reckless 
disregard of the truth.5 
 
B. Materiality 
 
Since there was sufficient evidence of omissions and 
assertions made knowingly, or with reckless disregard for 
the truth, we turn to the next step of the reconstructive 
surgery required by our jurisprudence, and assess whether 
the statements and omissions made with reckless disregard 
of the truth were "material, or necessary, to thefinding of 
probable cause." Sherwood, 113 F.3d at 399.6 To determine 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Wilson also attempts to inject a due process argument into what is 
primarily a fourth amendment claim, arguing that the officers were 
negligent in their investigation. However, negligence by public officials 
is 
not actionable as a due process deprivation of a civil right. See Orsatti 
v. New Jersey State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 484 (3d Cir. 1995) ("[T]he issue 
is not whether the information on which police officers base their request 
for an arrest warrant resulted from a professionally executed 
investigation; rather, the issue is whether that information would 
warrant a reasonable person to believe that an offense has been or is 
being committed by the person to be arrested."); see also Daniels v. 
Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986); Colburn v. Upper Darby Township, 946 
F.2d 1017 (3d Cir. 1991)). 
 
6. Wilson submits that even if the statements are not material, he should 
at least get nominal damages for Russo's failure to provide the judge 
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the materiality of the misstatements and omissions, we 
excise the offending inaccuracies and insert the facts 
recklessly omitted, and then determine whether or not the 
"corrected" warrant affidavit would establish probable 
cause. See Sherwood, 113 F.3d at 400. If it does, the grant 
of summary judgment should be affirmed, for even if there 
had not been omissions and misrepresentations in Russo's 
presentation to Judge Dilts, Wilson would have been 
arrested. 
 
Probable cause exists if there is a "fair probability" that 
the person committed the crime at issue. See Sherwood, 
113 F.3d at 401. "Probable cause to arrest exists when the 
facts and circumstances within the arresting officer's 
knowledge are sufficient in themselves to warrant a 
reasonable person to believe that an offense has been or is 
being committed by the person to be arrested." Orsatti, 71 
F.3d at 483. A police officer may be liable for civil damages 
for an arrest if "no reasonable competent officer" would 
conclude that probable cause exists. Malley v. Briggs, 475 
U.S. 335, 341 (1986). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
with exculpatory information. He relies on the Supreme Court's decision 
in Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266 (1978), which stated that a 
violation of procedural due process was actionable without a need to 
prove actual injury, or actual damages. See also Smith v. Chicago, 913 
F.2d 469, 472-73 (7th Cir. 1990). In Smith, the court held that actual 
damages for improvident police work leading to arrest was inappropriate 
because probable cause existed, so that no actual harm flowed from the 
recklessness, but allowed the award of nominal damages of $1 for the 
due process violation. See also Sutton v. Board of Education, 958 F.2d 
1339, 1352 (6th Cir. 1992) ("The denial of procedural due process is 
actionable for nominal damages without proof of actual injury."). On the 
strength of these cases, Wilson argues that Russo's omissions and 
fabrications are a harm independent of the injury of arrest. Although we 
find the argument interesting, we would not address it today even if we 
found its requirements met, because it was not raised in the complaint, 
at the district court level, or even in the opening briefs on appeal. 
Harris 
v. City of Philadelphia, 35 F.3d 840, 845 (3d Cir. 1994) (issues raised 
for 
the first time on appeal will not be considered). It was articulated for 
the 
first time in supplemental letter memoranda sent to the court less than 
a month before oral argument. 
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The defendants maintain that a positive identification by 
a victim is sufficient by itself to establish probable cause 
that the identified party was the offender. While we agree 
that a positive identification by a victim witness, without 
more, would usually be sufficient to establish probable 
cause, this qualified precept cannot be rendered absolute. 
Independent exculpatory evidence or substantial evidence 
of the witness's own unreliability that is known by the 
arresting officers could outweigh the identification such 
that probable cause would not exist. Each case must 
therefore be examined on its facts. 
 
For example, if two identifying witnesses had told the 
officer that the robber was 7', and the officer knew that the 
person in the photograph was 5', the positive identification 
would not be enough. Likewise, an otherwise credible victim 
identification would not provide probable cause if police 
officers contemporaneously possessed reliable DNA 
evidence which determined conclusively that the accused 
could not have committed the crime. Or, if Druce had, 
equally firmly, picked another person from the photo array, 
Braverman's identification might not have been sufficient 
for Russo to conclude that Wilson "probably" committed the 
crime. "An officer contemplating an arrest is not free to 
disregard plainly exculpatory evidence, even if substantial 
inculpatory evidence (standing by itself) suggests that 
probable cause exists." Kuehl v. Burtis, 173 F.3d 646, 650 
(8th Cir. 1999).7 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. We recognize that the Seventh Circuit has used language suggesting 
that exculpatory evidence or evidence of unreliability is totally 
irrelevant. 
See Tangwall v. Stuckey, 135 F.3d 510 (7th Cir. 1998). In Tangwall, a 
woman who had been raped called the police because she said she was 
convinced that a man that she had been observing for some time in the 
restaurant in which she worked was her attacker. She had previously 
described her attacker differently; the man in the restaurant was slightly 
older, heavier, taller, and had a different color hair and eyes than her 
original description. There was no corroborating evidence or independent 
exculpatory evidence. The court concluded that the officers had qualified 
immunity in that case, stating along the way that"the alleged 
discrepancies between Smith's original description of her attacker and 
Tangwall's appearance on the evening of his arrest do not affect our 
inquiry into whether Detective Stuckey's actions were objectively 
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The cases that the defendants cite for their argument fall 
into two basic camps: (1) those in which there was no 
exculpatory evidence or evidence of witness unreliability, 
such as United States v. Harris, 956 F.2d 177, 180 (8th Cir. 
1992); and (2) those in which the court concluded that a 
positive identification was not fatally undermined by 
unreliability or exculpatory evidence, such as Sharrar v. 
Felsing, 128 F.3d 810 (3d Cir. 1993) and Lallemand v. 
University of Rhode Island, 9 F.3d 214 (1st Cir. 1993). The 
first class of cases is inapposite here. Looking at the second 
class of cases, we find that courts have consistently 
considered the context of an identification, and have not 
stated that police can rely on any witness accusation, 
however unreliable or unbelievable. 
 
For example, in Sharrar we affirmed the principle that 
"[w]hen a police officer has received a reliable identification 
by a victim of his or her attacker, the police have probable 
cause." 128 F.3d at 818 (emphasis added). We concluded in 
that case that when the witness initially gave one name, 
but then identified her husband as her attacker, it was 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
reasonable in light of clearly established law." Id. at 517 (emphasis 
added). Although we would have no reason to take issue with the court's 
ultimate disposal of that case on its facts, especially given the 
relatively 
minor nature of the discrepancies, we find this statement overbroad, in 
that it appears to treat identifications as unimpeachable, and conflicts 
not only with the cases and language cited in the same section of the 
opinion, see id. at 516 (citing United States v. Decoteau, 932 F.2d 1205, 
1207 (7th Cir. 1991) for the proposition that "once a putative victim . . 
. 
has positively identified her attacker to the police and they have no 
reason to disbelieve her, the officers `need not take any additional steps 
to corroborate the information regarding the crime before taking 
action.' ") (emphasis altered)), but with suggestions in the case itself, 
in 
which the court went out of its way to discuss reasons to discount 
discrepancies in part because of the special circumstance of rape. See id. 
at n.11. Therefore, we are unwilling to follow the reading of that case 
urged by the defendants. We are also skeptical that the Seventh Circuit 
would adopt such a sweeping interpretation and consider there to be 
probable cause to arrest someone identified as the assailant if the police 
officers were aware that the victim, like the boy who cried wolf, had 
previously firmly identified several different people as her attacker and 
repeatedly called the police demanding that they be arrested. 
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reasonable for the officer to "assess Gannon's demeanor, 
find her story credible, and rely on her subsequent 
identification of her husband as the attacker" in part 
because it was a domestic violence case. Id. Likewise, in 
Lallemand, the First Circuit concluded that discrepancies in 
a victim's description were "trivial, given their nature" and 
in light of the positive identification, clearly implying that 
non-trivial discrepancies, or external evidence powerfully 
undermining the reliability of the witness's identification, 
might translate into a finding that there was no probable 
cause. 9 F.3d at 217.8 We reject the rule suggested by the 
defendants and engage in the routine probable cause 
analysis, weighing the inculpatory evidence against any 
exculpatory evidence available to the officer. 
 
The strongest inculpatory evidence is clearly the positive 
identification. Braverman had considerable opportunity to 
view the robber at the scene of the crime, and she exhibited 
a high level of certainty. There were three days between the 
crime and identification, so while it was not an entirely 
fresh identification, not so much time had passed as to call 
into question her recollection. Granted, Braverman's 
testimony should be viewed with some skepticism because 
her identification of Wilson was inherently incompatible 
with her description of the robber--according to the 
information available to Russo (Lipp's report), Braverman 
(and/or her coworker) originally described the robber as 
between 6'3" and 6'5". Although she did not know it, in 
identifying Wilson she identified someone much shorter. 
Both of these identifications cannot be correct. However, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. As in this case, Lallemand involved, among other things, a discrepancy 
in height. The victim initially described her attacker as 6', while 
Lallemand is 6'7". But later the victim told the police that her attacker 
was "much taller" than a police officer who was over 6', 9 F.3d at 215 
n.1, and no other witness (like Druce) had indicated his height, and the 
court acknowledged no independent exculpatory evidence. We do not 
disagree with the result, but think it was a simpler case. More 
importantly, we note that it did not apply a per se rule; on the contrary, 
it carefully examined the facts available to the officer that might be 
deemed to undercut the victim's credibility, such as her intoxication, and 
concluded that her identification was still reliable and probable cause 
existed even when these facts were taken into account. 
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this indication of unreliability does not, from the vantage 
point of the arresting officer, fatally undermine the forceful 
positive identification. Added to this identification is the 
fact that DaVila testified that she saw Wilson in the vicinity 
near the time of the theft. 
 
On the other hand, there are three exculpatory facts that 
Russo should have mentioned: (1) the robber was originally 
identified as someone 6'3" to 6'5", while Wilson is four to 
seven inches shorter;9 (2) one of the two victim-witness with 
ample opportunity to view the robber failed to identify 
Wilson when shown a photo array; and (3) DaVila saw 
Wilson out in the shopping center when he was supposedly 
in the flower shop. But these exculpatory facts, when 
weighed against the inculpatory facts, are not strong 
enough to undermine a finding of probable cause. Thus, we 
conclude that the District Court correctly found that no 
reasonable jury could find facts that would lead to the 
conclusion that Wilson's "corrected" warrant lacked 
probable cause. Therefore, we do not have to reach the 
second prong of the qualified immunity investigation, that 
is, whether the right was clearly established. 
 
In sum, we conclude that the District Court correctly 
concluded that Russo did not violate Wilson's constitutional 
right to be free of unlawful arrest. Therefore, we affirm the 
grant of summary judgment on qualified immunity 
grounds. 
 
III. Continued Incarceration 
 
Wilson contends that even if he was properly arrested in 
the first instance, he was kept in jail in violation of his 
rights because Russo learned of exculpatory facts after the 
arrest which should have motivated him to try to release 
Wilson. On February 7, Russo interviewed Wilson's friend 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. The dissent notes that both Braverman and Druce described the 
robber in terms of his notable height, citing to Druce's several 
statements about how "very tall" the intruder was. However, while the 
report available to Russo stated that the robber wasbetween 6'3" and 
6'5", there is no record evidence from which a jury could concludethat 
Braverman's and Druce's more detailed impressions were passed on to 
Russo. 
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George Richardson, who told Russo that Wilson had spent 
February 3 in his company. He told him that Wilson wore 
blue jeans, tan work boots, a beige sweatshirt and a brown 
jacket that day. He said that they had gone to the Towne 
Center, where Wilson went to get a lemonade at the pizza 
parlor while Richardson went to the bank. As evidence of 
his veracity, Richardson gave Russo a bank slip with 3:38 
stamped on it. Russo testified that he visited the bank and 
looked at the films from the bank's surveillance camera to 
look for Richardson, but that he could not recall what he 
saw and could not recall if the employees remembered  
Richardson.10 
 
Wilson contends that Russo's post-arrest interview with 
Richardson provided exculpatory information that 
dissipated probable cause, and that Russo had a 
constitutional duty to inform the prosecutor of the interview 
and attempt to get Wilson released. The law in this area is 
not entirely settled. Compare Brady v. Dill, 187 F.3d 104, 
112 (1st Cir. 1999) (concluding that police officers generally 
have no duty to try to release suspects when exculpatory 
information comes into their possession after a lawful 
arrest), with id. at 117-125 (Pollak, J., concurring) 
(proposing a rule by which "[a]n affirmative duty to release 
arises . . . if an arresting or custodial officer ascertains 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the suspicion (probable 
cause) which forms the basis for the privilege of arrest is 
unfounded."). See also Sanders v. English, 950 F.2d 1152, 
1162 (5th Cir. 1992) ("[F]ailure to disclose . . . undeniably 
credible and patently exculpatory evidence to the 
prosecuting attorney's office plainly exposes[defendant 
police officer] to liability under S 1983."); BeVier v. Hucal, 
806 F.2d 123, 128 (7th Cir. 1986) ("The continuation of 
even a lawful arrest violates the Fourth Amendment when 
the police discover additional facts dissipating their earlier 
probable cause."). 
 
We do not, today, need to decide these difficult issues. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. Russo also eventually interviewed the woman who had been in the 
flower shop on a bridal order. When shown the same photo array that 
Russo showed Braverman and Druce, she identified Wilson as the man 
who had been in the shop with her. 
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Regardless of the existence and scope of an officer's duty to 
seek to release a suspect when probable cause no longer 
exists, or the level of knowledge that he or she must have 
in order to trigger that duty, the interview with Richardson 
clearly did not dispel the earlier probable cause. 11 A friend 
of Wilson gave Wilson a partial alibi, and his description of 
Wilson's clothing did not match the victims' descriptions, 
but he placed Wilson in the vicinity at the time of the 
robbery, and nothing he said overwhelmed the fact of 
Braverman's positive identification. In short, no reasonable 
jury could conclude that this evidence dispelled probable 
cause. 
 
         For the foregoing reasons, the grant of summary 
judgment will be affirmed as to the federal claims. The case 
will be remanded to the District Court for consideration of 
the state claims. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. We also reject Wilson's suggestion that he has a due process claim 
because Russo should have done a better job of post-arrest investigation. 
As the Supreme Court stated in Baker v. McCollan , 443 U.S. 137, 145- 
146 (1979): 
 
         [W]e do not think a sheriff executing an arrest warrant is 
required 
         by the Constitution to investigate independently every claim of 
         innocence, whether the claim is based on mistaken identity or a 
         defense such as lack of requisite intent. Nor is the official 
charged 
         with maintaining custody of the accused named in the warrant 
         required by the Constitution to perform an error-free 
investigation of 
         such a claim. 
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GARTH, Circuit Judge, concurring: 
 
I agree that the District Court's decision granting 
summary judgment to the defendants must be affirmed.1 I 
write separately, however, because I take issue with the 
majority opinion's equivocal "probable cause" analysis as it 
relates to eyewitness identification. See Majority Op., Part 
II-B. 
 
Despite recognizing the argument "that a positive 
identification by a victim is sufficient by itself to establish 
probable cause that the identified party was the offender," 
id. at 15, the majority opinion insists upon adopting a 
"weighing" principle that forces us to weigh"exculpatory" 
facts against "inculpatory" facts. See id.  at 17-18. By doing 
so, the majority has misinterpreted and placed much 
emphasis on the reliability factor that the Supreme Court 
has held to be a necessary part of our Fourth Amendment 
analysis, see Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230 (1983). 
 
In probable cause analysis, it is the reliability of the 
witness (or victim) who has provided an identification of the 
assailant that is the focal point of the inquiry. It is not the 
reliability of the evidence provided in tandem with that 
individual's identification, which may be inconsistent with 
such an identification. As a result, the majority confuses a 
lack of reliability in an eyewitness with evidence that, at 
most, tends to exculpate the identified individual of 
wrongdoing and therefore simply is inconsistent with the 
victim's identification. Inconsistent or contradictory 
evidence may cut against a putative defendant's guilt at 
trial, but it cannot render invalid -- i.e., eliminate the 
probable cause necessary to obtain an arrest warrant-- a 
positive identification by an eyewitness who either a police 
officer or magistrate deemed to be reliable. 
 
Reliability in this context obviously means an eyewitness 
who is neither mentally impaired or delusional. See Jones 
v. City of Chicago, 856 F.2d 985, 994 (7th Cir. 1988) 
(stating that as long as the identifying victim eyewitness is 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. I further agree that because the District Court failed to address 
Wilson's state law claims, a remand is appropriate for this limited 
purpose. 
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"lucid," probable cause exists to arrest the identified 
individual). For instance, if the victim eyewitness were to 
show signs of insanity or other forms of mental instability, 
the reliability of that eyewitness would, in my view, 
justifiably be called into question. Statements during the 
identification process such as "That's the assailant! I'd 
know Abe Lincoln anywhere!" or "I believe that this is the 
thief, because he had three heads!" would signal such 
reliability concerns. Thus, it is the witness's  reliability that 
is at the core of our probable cause determination, not the 
reliability of the individual's identification, as required by 
the majority opinion's formula, which weighs exculpatory 
against inculpatory evidence. Majority Op., at 17-18. 
Accordingly, I part company with the majority opinion at 
the point where the majority seeks to distort the probable 
cause analysis to the point of virtually requiring trial-type 
proof at the very threshold stage of criminal investigation.2 
 
My thesis is simple and in accord with the prevailing 
jurisprudence. Once law enforcement officers have obtained 
a positive identification from a reliable witness, then, 
without more, probable cause exists to justify the arrest of 
the identified individual. As the Seventh Circuit has stated, 
"once a putative victim . . . has positively identified her 
attacker to the police and they have no reason to disbelieve 
her, the officers `need not take any additional steps to 
corroborate the information regarding the crime before 
taking action.' " Tangwall v. Stuckey, 135 F.3d 510, 516 
(7th Cir. 1988) (quoting United States v. Decoteau, 932 F.2d 
1205, 1207 (7th Cir. 1991)); see also Jones, 856 F.2d at 
994. 
 
Decisions from both this circuit and our sister circuits 
validate my interpretation of this interplay between the 
Fourth Amendment's probable cause requirement and 
victim eyewitness identifications, especially as they impact 
on the facts presented in this case. See Sharrar v. Felsing, 
128 F.3d 810 (3d Cir. 1997); Tangwell v. Stuckey , 135 F.3d 
510 (3d Cir. 1998); Lallemand v. University of Rhode Island, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. As the Supreme Court has stated, the standard for "probable cause 
does not demand the certainty we associate with formal trials." Illinois 
v. 
Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 246 (1983). 
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9 F.3d 214 (3d Cir. 1993); Greene v. City of Philadelphia, 
No. CIV. A. 97-4264, 1998 WL 254062 (E.D. Pa. May 8, 
1998). 
 
Specifically, in Sharrar v. Felsing, 128 F.3d 810 (3d Cir. 
1997), a woman telephoned 911 to report that she had 
been assaulted. See id. at 814. When the 911 operator 
asked the woman to identify the individual who had 
committed the assault, she immediately responded with the 
name Robert Carroll. See id. Once the police arrived, 
however, the woman had altered her story, and now alleged 
that her husband -- David Brigden -- was the assailant. 
See id. The police arrested Brigden, but after all charges 
against him had been dismissed, Bridgen brought a section 
1983 action against the police, alleging that they lacked the 
probable cause to arrest him. See id. at 816-17. In 
particular, Brigden argued that his wife's earlier 
identification of Carroll as her attacker so impaired her 
reliability as to abrogate any finding of probable cause. See 
id. at 818. 
 
We soundly rejected this argument, holding that law 
enforcement officers (or, presumably, a magistrate) need 
not carefully scrutinize an identification or other 
information provided by a victim of an alleged offense as 
they would with other informants. See id. at 818 (quoting 
Easton v. City of Boulder, 776 F.2d 1441, 1449 (10th Cir. 
1985)). Most importantly, however, the Sharrar  panel held 
that "[w]hen a police officer has received a reliable 
identification by a victim of his or her attacker, the police 
have probable cause." Id. (citing Torchinsky v. Siwinski, 942 
F.2d 257, 262 (4th Cir. 1991); Grimm v. Churchill, 932 F.2d 
674, 675 (7th Cir. 1991)); see also Greene v. City of 
Philadelphia, No. CIV. A. 97-4264, 1998 WL 254062, at *7 
(E.D. Pa. May 8, 1998) ("The principle that probable cause 
may be based on a single and reasonably reliable 
eyewitness identification, even though the identification 
may be tarnished by discrepancies in the witnesses' 
description of the perpetrator, is well-established."). By 
affirming the district court's finding of probable cause to 
arrest Bridgen, the panel in Sharrar implicitly stated that a 
victim's proffer of two different identifications for his or her 
attacker by name does not undermine the eyewitness's 
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reliability enough to eliminate probable cause to arrest. Any 
reading of the Sharrar opinion has to lead to the conclusion 
that it is the reliability of the eyewitness that is relevant 
and essential to the probable cause analysis, not the 
weighing process through which the majority attempts to 
modify our jurisprudence.3 
 
Sharrar's application to the present matter is striking. 
Within a matter of hours, the alleged victim in Sharrar 
provided the police with two different names for her 
assailant. Even in the face of this blatant inconsistency, the 
Sharrar court -- our court -- held that the purported 
victim's positive identification was sufficient to give rise to 
probable cause. 
 
To the contrary, the inconsistencies presented here are 
much less extreme. The only evidence that arguably can be 
considered inconsistent with Braverman's photo 
identification of Wilson was her earlier description of the 
assailant's height and Druce's inability to identify the 
assailant when presented with the same photo array. 
Merely providing a height range that is inconsistent with 
that of the individual identified does much less to question 
an eyewitness' reliability than does providing two different 
names of two different individuals within a span of hours. 
As such, any reading of our decision in Sharrar  -- to which 
this panel is, of course, bound -- must lead to the 
conclusion that Braverman's identification of Wilson, 
without more, was sufficient to give rise to probable cause. 
 
Even more persuasive, and nearly identical on a factual 
level, however, is Lallemand v. University of Rhode Island, 
9 F.3d 214 (1st Cir. 1993). In Lallemand, a university 
student alleged that she had been raped, and during a 
medical exam, stated that her assailant was a fraternity 
pledge named "Dan," who was around six feet tall with 
blond hair. See id. at 214-15. During the ensuing police 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The majority cites the Eighth Circuit's opinion in Kuehl v. Burtis, 173 
F.3d 646 (8th Cir. 1999), as support for this weighing process. The facts 
in Kuehl, however, do not concern eyewitness identification, and as such, 
render Kuehl completely inapplicable to the issue of the sufficiency of an 
eyewitness identification -- the probable cause determination presented 
in the instant case. 
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investigation, law enforcement officers showed the student 
photographs of each of the pledges from the fraternity at 
which the student claimed to have been assaulted. See id. 
at 215. Faced with these photos, the student "positively and 
without hesitation" identified, as her assailant, an 
individual named "David," who stood 6'7", and did not have 
blond hair. Id. at 215 & n.1. Notwithstanding these 
discrepancies, the First Circuit held that probable cause 
existed for "David's" arrest. See id. at 216-17. Indeed, the 
Lallemand court went so far as to state that"[t]he 
discrepancies concerning the assailant's first name, hair 
style, dormitory and height are trivial, given their nature 
and the positive identification." Id. at 217 (emphasis 
added); see also Tangwall, 135 F.3d at 516 ("The 
identification itself establishes probable cause to make an 
arrest, even where other witnesses' descriptions of the 
alleged perpetrator differ from the physical appearance of 
the individual so identified."). 
 
Given the factual similarities presented between 
Lallemand and the instant matter, and our own court's 
acceptance -- in Sharrar -- of the constitutional premise 
underlying the First Circuit's persuasive holding in 
Lallemand, the equivocal and therefore improper and 
erroneous nature of the majority's probable cause analysis 
becomes clear. 
 
In all other respects, however, I concur in the majority's 
analysis and its ultimate result. 
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POLLAK, District Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in 
part 
 
I agree with virtually all of the opinion of the court. With 
respect to the legal standards announced by the court, I 
join the court's opinion without reservation. Where I part 
company with the opinion is in the court's application of its 
correct summary judgment standard to the facts in this 
case. In my view, the question whether the " `corrected' 
warrant" application (i.e., the warrant application as it 
would have been, had it been amended to cure officer 
Russo's omissions and misstatement) established probable 
cause for Wilson's arrest is one that should be reserved for 
the finder of fact.1 
 
A. 
 
In a portion of the opinion of the court with which I do 
not take issue, the court determines that "[a]ny reasonable 
person would know that the significant height differential, 
and the fact that an eye-witness did not identify Wilson, 
were the kind of things the judge would wish to know." 
Supra p. 11-12 (quotation omitted). The court is surely 
correct in this conclusion. Like Braverman, Druce had 
ample opportunity to view the robber in the store, so his 
failure to identify the robber in the lineup is undoubtedly a 
significant fact. Braverman's and Druce's descriptions of 
the robber's height are at least as significant for these 
purposes. Braverman described the robber as "very tall" 
and estimated his height as between 6'2" and 6'4". Druce 
also described the robber as "very tall," guessing his height 
to be "about 6'5" tall, maybe a little bit taller." Indeed, the 
statements of Braverman and Druce reveal that they were 
very attentive to the robber's height. Druce, for instance, 
stated that while the robber was not someone he had seen 
before, "it would be someone I'd remember because of the 
height of him, he's very tall that's the first thing I said to 
Renee, `He's tall, he's very tall.' " 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. I agree with the court that summary judgment was properly granted 
in favor of officer Woroniecki for the reasons discussed by the court, 
supra p. 3-4 note 1. 
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For purposes of identification of a suspect, the 
significance of the difference in height between Wilson and 
the man described by Druce and Braverman may be even 
greater than is suggested by the court's statement that 
Wilson was "four to seven inches shorter" than the robber 
described in the police report. Supra p. 18. Both Druce and 
Braverman were quite clear that they viewed the robber as 
an exceptionally tall man. And while estimates of height 
may well be off by a few inches in either direction, it would 
be remarkable if someone who had had nearly an hour to 
observe a person of average height--as Wilson is--would 
describe that person as being exceptionally tall. And, of 
course, it would be that much more remarkable if two such 
observers made the same mistake. Thus, the height 
discrepancy was clearly a fact that a reasonable officer 
would expect a judge to want to know. It follows that 
knowingly omitting such information in the context of a 
warrant application would amount to reckless disregard for 
the truth, as the court has concluded. Similarly, the fact 
that Druce failed to identify Wilson was information that a 
judicial officer would be expected to want to know. And, 
finally, I agree with the court that Russo's statement to the 
judge about the timing of DaVila's seeing Wilson in the 
parking lot constituted reckless disregard for the truth. 
 
The court follows these conclusions with a discussion of 
the materiality of the omissions and misstatement, 
concluding that the omissions and misstatement were not 
material in the face of Braverman's positive identification. 
Indeed, the court concludes that "no reasonable jury could 
find facts that would lead to the conclusion that Wilson's 
`corrected' warrant lacked probable cause." Supra p. 18. 
 
That statement contains an implicit recognition of the 
fact that, in the Third Circuit, it is well established that 
"the existence of probable cause in a section 1983 action is 
a question of fact." Sherwood v. Mulvihill , 113 F.3d 396, 
401 (3d Cir. 1997); see also Groman v. Township of 
Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 635 (3d Cir. 1995) (reversing 
summary judgment as to issue of probable cause); Deary v. 
Three Un-Named Police Officers, 746 F.2d 185 (3d Cir. 
1984) (same); Patzig v. O'Neill, 577 F.2d 841 (1978) (holding 
that the existence of probable cause in civil cases is "a 
question for the jury"). 
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Judge Garth, in his concurrence, argues that a positive 
identification by an eyewitness deemed reliable by the 
police or the judicial officer issuing the warrant is 
conclusive--as a matter of law--on the question of probable 
cause without regard for any extrinsic evidence that may 
cast doubt on the accuracy of that identification. The court 
rejects Judge Garth's submission. While it is undeniable 
that a positive identification is very strong evidence in 
support of a finding of probable cause--a finding that, as 
Judge Garth correctly notes, is properly made on far less 
evidence than that needed to establish guilt--the court's 
rejection of a per se rule is surely correct. For, as the 
court's hypothetical illustrations demonstrate, there may 
well be cases in which the exculpatory evidence is so 
overwhelming as to outweigh the inculpatory effect of a 
positive identification, even for purposes of a showing of 
probable cause. 
 
It is not my view that the exculpatory evidence is so 
strong in this case as to require, as a matter of law, the 
conclusion that a judicial officer to whom the"corrected" 
warrant application was submitted could not have found 
probable cause. It is my view, however, that the present 
case is within the class of cases--a class that is likely to be 
a limited one where a positive identification has been 
obtained--in which a factfinder might reasonably conclude 
that a judicial officer assessing the "corrected" warrant 
application would not have found probable cause. I say this 
for the following reasons. 
 
The court acknowledges that Braverman's identification 
"should be viewed with some skepticism because her 
identification of Wilson was inherently incompatible with 
her description of the robber." Supra p. 17. While the court 
does not undertake to quantify the level of skepticism the 
court would apply, it appears that the level is not very high, 
for Braverman's weakened identification, coupled with 
DaVila's observation of Wilson in the vicinity, is still viewed 
by the court as sufficient to support the conclusion that a 
reasonable finder of fact would be required to conclude that 
a judicial officer would have found probable cause, 
notwithstanding other strongly exculpatory evidence: 
namely, Druce's description of Wilson and his failure to 
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identify Wilson as the robber, and the fact that Wilson was 
seen in the parking lot at a time when the robber was in 
the flower shop. By contrast, it seems to me well within the 
range of plausibility that a judicial officer assessing the 
"corrected" warrant application, (1) might have viewed 
Braverman's identification with very considerable 
skepticism; (2) might have largely or entirely discounted 
DaVila's statement, given that the time at which DaVila 
said she saw Wilson in the parking lot was the very time at 
which the robber was in Braverman's flower shop; and (3) 
might have credited the other exculpatory evidence quite 
highly. If so, the judicial officer might reasonably have 
concluded that probable cause had not been established. 
"But the weight that a neutral magistrate would likely have 
given such information is a question for the finder of fact." 
Velardi v. Walsh, 40 F.3d 569 (2d Cir. 1994). Accordingly, 
so it seems to me, the District Court's grant of summary 
judgment on the question of probable cause was 
inappropriate. 
 
That it would be reasonable to conclude that Russo had 
not established probable cause is strongly supported by the 
court's conclusion that any reasonable person would view 
the omitted information as information that a judicial 
officer would want to know--a conclusion that, as I have 
discussed, is quite proper given the significance of that 
information in the context of the present case. A judicial 
officer would be expected to want to know this information 
largely because such information at least had the potential 
to make a difference in the determination of the existence 
of probable cause. It is thus puzzling that the court appears 
to conclude both (1) that it would be unreasonable to keep 
the information from the judge, which would seem to 
suggest that it could make a difference to a probable cause 
inquiry, and (2) that it would be unreasonable to conclude 
that the information would have made a difference to 
probable cause. It appears that the court views the 
information as potentially significant in thefirst context, 
but necessarily insignificant in the second. For the reasons 
discussed above, I agree with the court that the information 
omitted and misstated by Russo was of substantial 
significance. And, for essentially the same reasons, I also 
believe that a factfinder could find that, had it been 
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supplied, the omitted and misstated information would 
have had a determinative effect on the issue of probable 
cause, even in the face of a positive identification.2 
 
B. 
 
In the previous section, I stated my agreement with the 
court that Russo's misstatement and omissions were in 
reckless disregard for the truth. But I have concluded, in 
disagreement with the court, that a factfinder could find 
that, but for the misstatement and omissions, a judicial 
officer would not have issued an arrest warrant, from which 
it follows that Russo's conduct could be found by a 
factfinder to have deprived Wilson of a constitutional right. 
The right not to be arrested on the basis of a warrant 
obtained on the basis of a law enforcement officer's 
representations or omissions made in reckless disregard of 
the truth is a clearly established right. See Lippay v. 
Christos, 996 F.2d 1490, 1504 (3d Cir. 1993) ("If a police 
officer submits an affidavit containing statements he knows 
to be false or would know are false if he had not recklessly 
disregarded the truth, the officer obviously failed to observe 
a right that was clearly established. Thus, he is not entitled 
to qualified immunity."). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. A fortiori, I also disagree with the court's conclusion, in section III 
of 
the court's opinion, that no reasonable factfinder could have found that 
the additional exculpatory evidence gathered by Russo subsequent to 
Wilson's arrest undermined probable cause. (As the court's opinion 
notes, see supra p. 19, I have had occasion, in Brady v. Dill, 187 F.3d 
104, 123 (1st Cir. 1999) (concurring), to address the further question, 
which the court in the present case identifies but does not undertake to 
resolve, whether an officer who acquires evidence which incontestably 
establishes the innocence of a person he holds in custody is 
constitutionally obligated to release that person without seeking judicial 
intervention. In Brady, I was sitting as a member of a First Circuit 
panel, 
and my affirmative answer to the question was rejected by the panel 
majority. In my view, application to the present record of either the 
standard I endorsed in Brady, or that adopted by the Brady majority, 
would preclude recovery on this basis. Accordingly, I do not differ with 
the ultimate conclusion reached by the court; that is, that summary 
judgment is appropriately affirmed with respect to plaintiff 's claim 
discussed in section III of the court's opinion.) 
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Accordingly, I would reverse the entry of summary 
judgment in favor of Russo, and remand the case for 
further proceedings. 
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         Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
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